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Political risk represents an important hidden transaction cost that reduces interna-
tional trade. This paper investigates the claim that German public export credit
guarantees (Hermes guarantees) mitigate this friction to trade ￿ows and hence pro-
mote exports. We employ an empirical trade gravity model, where we explicitly
control for political risk in the importing country in order to evaluate the e￿ect of
export guarantees. The idea behind export promotion through public export credit
agencies (ECAs) is that the private market is unable to provide adequate insurance
for all risks associated with exports. As a consequence, ￿rms’ export activities are
limited in the absence of insurance provision. Using a novel data set on guarantees
we estimate the e￿ect of guarantees in a static and dynamic panel model. We ￿nd a
statistically and economically signi￿cant positive e￿ect of public export guarantees
on exports which indicates that export promotion is indeed e￿ective. Furthermore,
political risk turns out to be a robust determinant of exports and hence should be
taken into account in any empirical model of trade.
Keywords: public export credit guarantees, political risk, panel regression.
JEL classi￿cation: F13, H81, C23.
1Non-technical summary
Beginning with Jan Tinbergen in 1962, the academic literature early on pointed
to political risk as an important impediment to international trade. This form of
risk represents an additional transaction cost which has to be taken into account by
￿rms in their export decisions since political events may lead to payment arrears or
even default. While this notion became widely accepted, the empirical evidence on
the role of political risk is relatively scant.
A recent article has focused on the role of export credit guarantees, which are
granted to insure exporters against political risks and thus promote exports. This
article acknowledges political risk as a friction to trade but has neglected this friction
in the empirical analysis.
Our contribution to the literture is threefold. First, we incorporate political risk
into our empirical model of exports. Secondly, we provide evidence on the e￿ec-
tiveness of export credit guarantees in fostering exports using a novel data set on
export credit guarantees from the German Export Credit Agency (ECA) Euler Her-
mes. Speci￿cally, our data set comprises German exports and guarantees to 130
countries over the period 1991 to 2003. Third, we apply a dynamic panel estimator
which allows us to capture export dynamics, i.e. to take the e￿ect of past exports
on current exports into account.
The main ￿ndings are as follows. Our results underline political risk as an impor-
tant impediment to exports. Political risk in an importing country has a signi￿cant
and negative impact on German exports. Furthermore we ￿nd that export credit
guarantees have a positive and signi￿cant in￿uence on exports. Note that the inclu-
sion of political risk only leads to a small reduction of the e￿ect of guarantees on
exports.
In order to evaluate the e￿ectiveness of guarantees on exports, we focus on the
long term multiplier. We interpret a multiplier with a value below one as ine￿ective,
because it implies that an additional Euro of guarantees leads to less than a propor-
tional increase in exports. Our results suggest that guarantees are indeed e￿ective
in stimulating exports. An additional euro of guarantees leads to a more than pro-
portionate rise in exports. However, the size of the multiplier is shown to crucially
depend on estimators used and sub-samples considered. With regard to the former,
static panel estimators suggest a considerably larger multiplier than dynamic esti-
mators, which may potentially be due to a bias of the static estimator. With regard
to sub-samples, we can for instance only con￿rm an e￿ective export promotion for
non-industrial countries from 1999 onwards. The latter may be due to a change in
the regulation of ECAs.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Jan Tinbergen ￿usserte bereits 1962 die Vermutung, dass politische Risiken eine
hemmende Wirkung auf den internationalen Handel haben k￿nnten. Die Begr￿ndung
daf￿r ist, dass politische Risiken zus￿tzliche Transaktionskosten darstellen, die in
die Exportentscheidung von Firmen einbezogen werden. W￿hrend dies allgemein
anerkannt ist, gibt es bislang nur wenige empirische Belege daf￿r in der Literatur.
In einem erst k￿rzlich publizierten Artikel wird die E￿ektivit￿t der Exportgaran-
tien, die als Versicherung gegen politische Risiken vergeben werden, untersucht.
W￿hrend die hemmende Wirkung von politischen Risiken erw￿hnt wird, wird diese
Friktion nicht in der empirischen Analyse ber￿cksichtigt.
In diesem Beitrag werden dagegen politische Risiken bei der empirischen Evaluier-
ung von Exportgarantien einbezogen. Als Grundlage der empirischen Analyse dient
ein neuer Datensatz der Euler-Hermes Kreditversicherung AG. Dieser Datensatz
umfasst die deutschen Exporte und Exportgarantien f￿r 130 L￿nder von 1991 bis
2003. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Studien verwenden wir unter anderem auch einen dy-
namischen Sch￿tzansatz, der es erm￿glicht, den Ein￿uss historischer Exportstr￿me
auf gegenw￿rtige Exporte zu untersuchen.
Unsere Ergebnisse best￿tigen die hemmende Wirkung von politischen Risiken auf
die Exporte. In anderen Worten, es werden deutlich weniger deutsche Waren in
L￿nder mit hohen politische Risiken ausgef￿hrt. Zudem l￿sst sich ein positiver und
signi￿kanter Ein￿uss von Exportgarantien auf die Exporte feststellen. Die Ber￿ck-
sichtigung von politischem Risiko f￿hrt nur zu einem geringen R￿ckgang des E￿ektes
der Garantien auf die Exporte.
Im Rahmen der Evaluierung der Garantien untersuchen wir insbesondere den
langfristigen Multiplikatore￿ekt, den Garantien auf Exporte haben. Ist der Multi-
plikator kleiner als Eins interpretieren wir dies als nicht-e￿ektiv, da ein zus￿tzlicher
Euro an Garantien dann langfristig zu weniger als einem Euro Exporten f￿hrt. Insge-
samt deuten unsere Ergebnisse auf einen Multiplikator gr￿￿er Eins hin, so dass Ex-
portgarantien zu einer ￿berproportionalen Steigerung der Exporte f￿hren. Es zeigt
sich jedoch, dass der Wert des Multiplikators massgeblich von dem Sch￿tzansatz und
der Stichprobe abh￿ngt. Eine Sch￿tzung mittels statischer Verfahren f￿hrt beispiels-
weise zu einem deutlich h￿heren Multiplikator als mittels dynamischer Verfahren.
In die gleiche Richtung wirkt sich eine Beschr￿nkung der Stichprobe auf Nicht-
Industriel￿nder aus. F￿r diese L￿ndergruppe zeigen die Ergebnisse erst ab 1999 eine
e￿ektive F￿rderung von Exporten durch Garantien. Dies k￿nnte auf die positive
Wirkung einer Reform der Regulierung von Exportkreditagenturen zur￿ckzuf￿hren
sein.Contents
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1 Introduction
Exports safeguard economic growth, jobs and a good standard of
living in Germany. A country which is a successful exporter needs a
strong and reliable state export credit insurance scheme. This is
particularly important for opening up the di￿cult markets
in the threshold and developing countries. 2
Apart from purely economic variables it is likely that
political or semi-political factors play a part in determining
the volume of trade between countries. 3
Political risk matters to international trade activity, because it represents an
important hidden transaction cost. Meon and Sekkat (2004) ￿nd that participa-
tion of Middle East and North African countries in the world economy is severely
strained due to political risk and low quality of institutions. Anderson and Mar-
couiller (2002) provide evidence for the importance of insecurity and corruption on
international trade patterns within a gravity framework.
The basic idea behind trade gravity models is related to Newtonian physics stat-
ing that trade volumes between two countries depend positively on economic mass
and negatively on resistance. While the trade constraining e￿ect of distance and
asymmetric information is well documented, political risk as another crucial friction
to trade has been largely neglected in the academic literature so far.
Export promotion aims at mitigating frictions in international trade. Governments
seek to stimulate exports by granting export credit guarantees against export risks,
especially political risks. While this public sector intervention was hotly debated in
the past due to potential subsidy rates in the risk premia charged from exporters,
several international agreements and regulations largely repelled these concerns. 4
1This paper represents the authors’ personal opinions and does not necessarily re￿ect the views
of Deutsche Bank Research, the Deutsche Bundesbank or its sta￿. The paper is a project of the
Chair for International Macroeconomics at the University of Mainz and the Department for Bank-
ing Supervision at Deutsche Bundesbank. The authors are especially indebted to Dieter Urban,
Stefan Bergheim, Peter Egger, Helmut Reisen and Beatrice Weder for support and discussions.
We also bene￿ted from discussions with seminar participants at the 2nd Macroeconomic Work-
shop, especially Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch and Jan-Egbert Sturm, at Deutsche Bundesbank, in
particular Thilo Liebig and Frank Heid, and at the University of Mainz, especially Yvonne Lange
and Sven Drebes. Financial support by the Deutsche Bundesbank during the work on this paper
is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Euler Hermes for kindly providing data and their sta￿ for
fruitful discussions. Any errors or omissions are, of course, our own.
2Wolfgang Clement, Former German Economy Minister (AGA, 2003).
3Tinbergen (1962, p.265).
4This claim is supported by the data exempli￿ed in Table 3 in the appendix. O￿cial export
credit agencies started to break-even in the mid 1990s. More details on this table and the mentioned
agreements will be given below. Important contributions in this strand of literature include Melitz
and Messerlin (1987), Abraham and Dewit (2000) and Dewit (2001).
1Notably, the empirical literature has very little to say about the trade promoting
e￿ect of export credit agencies (ECAs). Since all industrial and an increasing number
of emerging countries have installed ECAs, this comes as a surprise. 5 Beyond that it
is remarkable that ECAs receive relatively little public attention even though their
total new ￿nancing commitments averaged about USD 85 billion each year over the
period 1998 to 2002, outnumbering gross o￿cial development assistance and gross
international ￿nancial institution lending (Wang et al., 2005). 6
While the scope and exact objective of an ECA may vary from country to country,
most of them were founded on grounds of market imperfections in the export insur-
ance sector, namely inadequate provision of risk insurance by the private sector. The
argument goes that a lack of export insurance places high risks on exporting ￿rms
and thus limits their exporting activities. The primary function of export credit
agencies can thus be seen in removing or reducing uncertainties and risks inherent
to international trade, or at least to shift them away from exporters and their banks
and thus to promote trade (Stephens, 1999). The German government seeks export
promotion primarily through Euler Hermes, the German export credit agency. 7
The empirical and theoretical literature on export promotion is rather scant. 8 An
important recent empirical contribution is Egger and Url (2006) who on the one
hand test for the trade promoting e￿ect of public export credit guarantees provided
by the Oesterreichische Kontrollbank (OeKB) and on the other hand investigate if
these state guarantees in￿uence the export structure with regard to industries and
countries. Using newly granted guarantees disaggregated on a 2-digit industry level
for the period 1996-2002 the authors ￿nd that Austria’s ECA indeed fosters export
activity. Interestingly, they ￿nd that a small positive short-term e￿ect is outreached
by a much more pronounced long-term e￿ect. The overall multiplier amounts to 2.8.
The export structure does not seem to be altered by the provision of public export
insurance.
While our empirical approach is related to Egger and Url (2006), we make three
important contributions. First, we extent their empirical model by the friction that
5Many o￿cial export credit agencies (ECAs) in industrial countries were founded after World
War II. Major ECAs include Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the United
Kingdom, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Euler Hermes of Germany, Compagnie
Fran￿aise d’Assurance pour le Commerce ExtØrieur (COFACE) of France, Sezione Speciale per
l’Assicurazione del Credito all’Esportazione (SACE) of Italy and International Trade Policy Bu-
reau, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (EID/MITI) of Japan, just to name a few of
them. Most o￿cial export credit agencies of OECD-countries and some private insurers are part
of the Berne Union, the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers.
6The ￿gure refers to the amount of exports guaranteed by the Berne Union, whose members
are largely but not exclusively from the public sector. The ￿gures for gross o￿cial development
assistance and gross international ￿nancial institution lending amount to about USD 67 billion
and USD 60 billion per year over the same period (Wang et al., 2005).
7Note that Euler Hermes is able not only to underwrite export credit insurance on behalf of the
German government (as a public export credit agency) but also to take export insurance on their
own account (as a member of the Allianz Group - private sector insurance). This paper only refers
to the public dimension of the insurance activities of Euler Hermes.
8Recent empirical studies dealing with alternative means to promote exports are provided by
Rose (2005), Nitsch (2005) and Gil-Pareja et al. (2005), who focus on the impact of embassies,
state visits and regional trade agencies on foreign trade. The theoretical literature on (o￿cial)
export credit insurance includes Funatsu (1986), Dewit (2001) and Rienstra-Munnicha and Turvey
(2002).
2gives rise to export guarantees, namely political risk. Secondly, we evaluate the
claim that German export credit guarantees indeed foster the export activities of
German companies in a dynamic framework. And third, while the international
comparison with the Austrian case is interesting in itself, we analyze in the case of
Euler Hermes a dominant player in the world export credit insurance market. In the
year 2004, Euler Hermes granted about 21 billion Euro of new export guarantees
(AGA, 2004), i.e. exports worth 21 billion Euro (about 2.9 percent of total exports)
were guaranteed on behalf of the German government. 9 The total exposure of the
Federal Government stood on average at roughly 115 billion Euro over the last seven
years. Over the period 1990 to 2002 Euler Hermes accounted on average for nearly
one ￿fth of all new commitments underwritten by members of the Berne Union, the
International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, encompassing all important
o￿cial ECAs and a number of private (re)insurers. 10
Our main ￿ndings are the following: First, we ￿nd strong evidence that political
risk has a detrimental e￿ect on exports. This ￿nding con￿rms the opening quote
by Jan Tinbergen that political factors do matter for international trade. We ￿nd a
statistically and economically signi￿cant impact of political risk in empirical trade
models, which has been largely neglected in the empirical trade literature so far.
Secondly, we can con￿rm the e￿ectiveness of guarantees for export promotion. Our
results suggest a multiplier in the range of 1.7 to around 6, i.e. for every additional
unit of granted export guarantee exports increase by up to six units. Hence, these
results indicate that Euler Hermes seems to live up to one of its basic rationales for
existence: German export promotion. However, we also ￿nd that the e￿ect di￿ers for
the sub-sample of non-industrial countries as well as for the time period considered.
While we cannot con￿rm this e￿ect for non-industrial countries prior to 1999, we
￿nd an export promoting e￿ect of guarantees for the period since then. Third, our
dynamic panel approach allows us to provide evidence that a dynamic speci￿cation
is warranted to model international trade in a gravity framework.
This paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we discuss why pub-
lic sector intervention in the market for export insurance may be warranted. We
further provide a description of the functioning of the German ECA and the rele-
vant international agreements in place. The third section takes a closer look at the
data, explains the estimation strategy and formulates the testing hypothesis. The
following section contains the results and discusses the various robustness checks
undertaken. The ￿nal section summarizes the results and provides an outlook for
future research.
2 The institutional setting
In the following section, we provide the theoretical motivation for public export
guarantees. Furthermore, we describe how Euler Hermes works in practise.
9Note that about 8 percent of all exports to non-industrial countries are guaranteed, while only
about 0.25 percent of exports to industrial countries are guaranteed.
10Authors’ calculations based on ￿gures provided by Wang et al. (2005) and AGA (2004).
32.1 Motivation for public export guarantees
The theoretical starting point for the discussion is the Arrow-Debreu model which
assumes that an insurance market for any type of risk exists. 11 In an economy with
complete markets and full information available to all agents, markets for all future
states of the world exist and risk can be priced on forward markets. If desired, agents
can thus hedge against certain risks according to their risk attitude by buying and
selling forward contracts. If markets are incomplete and/or asymmetric information
exists, government intervention might be useful in order to improve e￿ciency.
International trade is commonly conducted on the basis either of payment on
receipt of goods or of payment within 180 days of receipt (Stephens, 1999). This
introduces some degree of uncertainty for the exporter with respect to the shipment
and timely payment of the importer. On the one hand, the importer may become
insolvent and hence defaults on the export contract (commercial risk) and on the
other hand actions by an importer’s host government may cause nonpayment on
an export contract (political risk).12 Such action may include foreign exchange re-
strictions, debt moratoria or acts of war. Assuming risk averse exporters, we expect
them to seek protection against such risks. That said, exporters are willing to pay a
risk insurance premium in order to hedge against some or all of the risks inherent to
their international trade activities. The crucial question is whether well-functioning
(private) markets exist for all export risks. In what follows, we will describe the
reasoning behind market imperfection for the political risk insurance.
Three main arguments can be brought forward in support of a market imper-
fection, namely i) high correlations of risks in an export credit portfolio ii) strong
time-varying risk exposures and iii) potentially higher recovery rates of claims stem-
ming from political risk arrears by export credit agencies. While the ￿rst two ar-
guments constitute characteristics of export credit risks that make them di￿erent
from other (industrial) risks and challenge the insurability of export credit risk 13 ,
the last argument is linked to sovereign risk issues.
With regard to the ￿rst argument, export credit risks by their very nature tend
to be highly correlated. Given that credits at risk are concentrated within a given
country all credits are exposed to the same (political) risk which thus cannot be
easily diversi￿ed away.14 Hence, the assumption of independence among exposure
units and the randomness of losses does not hold in this context. On top of that,
11The following paragraph mainly relies on Alsem et al. (2003) and Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1999,
p.269f).
12It is nowadays commonly accepted that political risk constitutes an important subgroup of
country risk. For further details see for instance Bouchet et al. (2003).
13We only focus on those risks and speci￿cs of export credit risk that warrant a closer look for
our research question. More generally, Schmit (1986) lists the following requisites of an ideally
insurable risk: large number of homogeneous exposure units; independence among exposure units;
calculable expected loss in monetary values; de￿nite loss as to time, place, amount, and cause;
fortuitous loss; economic feasibility; avoidance of catastrophe potential.
14The arguments with respect to the speci￿cs of export credit risk are mainly based on Alsem
et al. (2003, ch. 3). Consider for instance the imposition of capital controls - or even worse the
declaration of a debt moratorium - that prevent private domestic companies in an emerging market
from buying foreign exchange. If twenty enterprises bought export insurance against this risk type
in a single country from the same insurer, it would be highly likely that the insurer has to pay out
all twenty companies as a consequence of this event.
4potential contagion from one country to another may even question the independence
of political risks across countries. Hence, risks tend to deteriorate in tandem and
losses are concentrated. The unbalancedness of a portfolio of export credit risks can
become high.15 This in turn may negatively a￿ect the economic feasibility, because
a relatively unbalanced risk portfolio requires the (re)insurer to hold relatively more
capital reserves and/or drives risk premiums up. This may prevent a liquid private
market from unfolding.
Secondly, the local political conditions may change quickly and surprisingly due
to external events such as war, acts of terrorism or internal events such as elections
or political turbulence. Recent developments in Latin America, where international
investors are currently facing a high expropriation risk, underline that political con-
ditions not only may change quickly but are also interlinked. 16 In such situations, it
becomes very hard for the insurer to gauge the actual risk of an export credit cover
beyond a few months in the future, resulting in higher risk aversion on the insurers
side. Alsem et al. (2003, p.45) underline that one cannot necessarily infer from past
political risk experience to future developments a￿ecting the risk portfolio. These
characteristics imply that export credit insurance require a high pro￿t margin and
high capital requirements.
Finally, a further argument in favor of a public sector intervention through credit
export agencies is based on the speci￿cs of sovereign debt. It is argued that the
government has an advantage over the private sector in recovering claims in the
absence of an international or supranational bankruptcy court. The government can
bundle all its claims and put various diplomatic means to use in order to recover
due obligations. This may result in bilateral negotiations and/or multilateral debt
rescheduling under the aegis of the Paris Club. Public o￿cials acknowledge that
"high expectations of recoveries from political claims under rescheduling agreements
are justi￿ed " (AGA, 2003, p.71). Figure 1 in the appendix shows claims paid out
by Euler Hermes due to and recoveries from political risk. It is noteworthy that debt
restructuring agreements make up for the largest share of recoveries. 17
In sum, market imperfection relevant to our research question may be threefold.
First of all, if the price of a risk transfer, namely the insurance premium, is getting
too high for exporters exposed to political risk, no transfer takes place and no
market for this particular risk transfer will develop. Against the background of
elevated political risk in developing countries, there is still a considerable amount
of potential trade and/or investment that does not take place due to the absence of
political risk insurance. Secondly, and linked to the ￿rst argument, private insurance
companies are not willing or able to bolster such risks with su￿cient capital. The
complex nature of political risk and the large scale of potential losses in typical
medium-term projects would require very high capital reserves. Finally, recovery
rates from defaults and arrears stemming from political risk may be higher, when
15Alsem et al. (2003) measure unbalancedness of risks in a given portfolio through the correlation
between risks.
16After Bolivia’s president Morales declared a re-nationalization of the country’s oil and gas
industry at the beginning of May 2006, Ecuador’s president Palacio mimicked his counterparts’
decision two weeks later.
17Still, the data has to be interpreted with some caution since there are usually considerable
lags between the moment a claim is paid out and it can be (partly) recovered through a debt
restructuring agreement.
5the government manages the claims.
2.2 How does Euler Hermes work?
Commercial risk and political risk are the two main categories of risk which are typ-
ically insured by export credit agencies. 18 The German government provides export
and investment credit guarantees to companies and banks via a consortium consist-
ing of Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG and PricewaterhouseCoopers AG. 19
The aim of these guarantees is to provide an insurance against risks not adequately
covered by the market and thus to promote trade with developing countries (Euler
Hermes, 2003). These guarantees are commonly referred to Hermes guarantees or
Hermes Buergschaften and encompass general political risk, conversion and transfer
risk as well as other commercial risks. 20 There are essentially two ways a guarantee
can be granted by Euler Hermes. Either, the export credit agency grants a supplier
credit which essentially implies selling insurance directly to the exporter. Alterna-
tively, if a bank ￿nances the export activity, the insurance can be given to the bank
to cover default risk. In this case, the insurance coverage of the ECA is re-directed
from the exporter to his house bank. Other simple scenarios include that the ex-
porter’s bank directly applies for the insurance in country A or that a bank grants
the importer a credit in country B, implying a bank relationship between a German
bank and a bank abroad.
Another aspect of export guarantees is the nexus between Euler Hermes and the
Federal state. The German government is involved in three decisive ways in the pro-
vision of credit guarantees. First, public export credit guarantees are fully integrated
into the accounts of the government. Income such as premiums, fees and monies re-
covered are transferred to the federal budget accounts. All disbursements and costs
incurred such as indemni￿cation of claims and administrative expenses are also paid
out of federal funds. Euler Hermes is paid a fee for handling the export credit scheme
(Euler Hermes, 2003). Secondly, the statutory maximum exposure limit represents
the maximum amount up to which liability in form of granted export guarantees
may be accepted by the Federal Government under the Federal Budget Law. Euler
Hermes can underwrite export risks on behalf of the German state up to this ceil-
ing, whereby it is noteworthy that the Interministerial Committee (IMC) examines
all major applications and decides whether to grant cover. However, the statutory
maximum exposure limit has traditionally not been fully exhausted. Table 6 gives
18Euler Hermes de￿nes commercial risk as the risk that the importer (private buyers only)
becomes insolvent or fails to pay within six months after due date. Euler Hermes covers the following
types of political risks: (i) general political risk such as legislative or administrative measures, wars,
riots or revolution, which prevent payment of the covered debt, (ii) conversion and transfer risk such
as non-conversion and non-transfer of local currency deposits made by the buyer as a consequence
of restrictions placed on international money transfer, namely capital controls or an outright debt
moratorium, (iii) loss of goods due to political events and (iv) loss of entitlement to payment due
to impossibility of contract ful￿lment. See http://www.exportkreditgarantien.de/eng/index.html
(6.1.2005).
19Euler Hermes is mainly responsible for credit export guarantees and PwC is largely in charge
of investment guarantees and untied loan guarantees. For simplicity, we will use henceforth Hermes
for Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG and PricewaterhouseCoopers AG synonymously.
20From here onwards, we use the term political risk interchangeably for political, conversion and
transfer risks.
6an overview over the guarantee business of Euler Hermes. 21 A comparison of column
(6) and (7) reveals that granted guarantees have not exceeded once the total ceiling
in the period from 1991 to 2003. This provides evidence that demand for export
guarantees is not restricted in practice by this upper ceiling(AGA, 2004). Secondly,
Table 6 shows that applications for cover are substantially higher than newly granted
guarantees. This suggests prima facie that demand for export guarantees is consid-
erably restrained, but the existing gap can be partly explained by the fact that not
all applications ￿nally result in an export business. In addition, for some countries a
speci￿c ceiling is ￿xed which consequently may restrain the demand for export cov-
erage in the respective countries. Finally, the risk premia charged by Euler Hermes
are based on country ratings. Hence provided that ratings used by Euler Hermes
adequately re￿ects risk insurance should be priced appropriately. 22
There are several international agreements in place that regulate the activities of
public export credit agencies’ (ECAs). First, the World Trade Organization’s Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) disciplines the use of export
subsidies. This agreement demands premia to cover long-term operating costs and
losses and was strengthened in 1995. Table 3 in the appendix shows premia received,
recoveries from defaulted payments and claims that were paid out by Berne Union
members and Euler Hermes, respectively. Following Dewit (2001) the sum of premia
and recoveries is divided by total claims. The last two columns show this ratio for the
Berne Union and Euler Hermes. A ratio below 1 means that income from risk insur-
ance is insu￿cient to cover reimbursements claimed, indicating a subsidy component
in the risk premia charged to exporters. The Berne Union started to break-even in
the mid 1990s and Euler Hermes in 1998 as exempli￿ed by a ratio larger than 1.
Secondly, the so-called Knaepen-Package ensures (as part of a more general OECD
Consensus Arrangement) an international level playing-￿eld by establishing guiding
principles for minimum risk-based premium fees for country and sovereign risks. The
Knaepen-Package has become e￿ective in 1999. The European Union 23 has taken a
third regulatory action by restricting ECAs’ activities to non-marketable risks (in
contrast to marketable risks). The rationale behind this decision is to eliminate dis-
tortions of competition in the export risk insurance market, where private provision
is expected to cover the demand at reasonable risk premia. According to the EU
short-term business to OECD core members represents such a case. Hence, ECAs
are restricted from short-term public export guarantees that aim at covering export
risks to OECD core members with a maturity of less than two years since 1998.
Export business with a duration of over two years can still be insured by ECAs.
3 Empirical strategy
In this section we conduct an empirical analysis focusing on the impact of guarantees
and political risk on exports. Hence, we test whether Euler Hermes guarantees actu-
ally promote German exports and whether political risk hampers German exports.
21Figures in columns (2) to (4) are based on the data set in use and may diverge from o￿cial
￿gures in the annual reports due to rounding errors and exchange rate conversion.
22Support for the adequacy of ECA ratings is provided by the proposals under Basel II. The use
of ratings provided by ECAs is explicitly permitted to calculate capital requirements for banks.
23For further details see http://ec.europa.eu/trade (22.9.2006).
7Before presenting the empirical strategy employed, we brie￿y describe the data in
use. Finally, we present the results as well as robustness checks.
3.1 The data
Our analysis relies on data from various sources. To begin with, we use data on Ger-
man exports provided by the Federal Statistical O￿ce Germany, which is displayed
in Table 4 in the appendix. As can be seen, most exports are directed to industrial
countries, which amounted to 483 billion Euro or 73 percent of total exports in the
year 2003. This fact can be rationalized by the "new trade theory" emphasizing
the importance of intra-industry trade among countries with similar factor endow-
ments.24 The second most important destination of German exports is Emerging
Europe where exports accounted for 13 percent of total exports in 2003, followed by
Asia with around 6 percent.
Especially noteworthy is that the export growth dynamics largely stem from non-
industrial countries. While exports to industrial countries grew by about 6 percent
per annum over the period 1991 to 2003, export growth to non-industrial countries
was nearly twice as high (around 12 percent per annum). Eastern Europe experienced
the strongest growth of German exports, with exports growing on average at 20
percent per annum from 11 billion Euro shortly after the fall of the iron curtain to
90 billion Euro in 2003. The dynamic development in this region, the scrapping of
trade barriers as well as the region’s geographic proximity to Germany have certainly
underpinned this trend. Exports to Asia developed dynamically as well with around
11 percent per annum growth. Note that the export ￿gures for Asia re￿ect the
Asian crisis in 1997, with exports plunging in the following two years and the pre-
crisis level only to be reached again in 2000. While export growth to the Western
Hemisphere25 is slightly higher than to industrial countries, Africa and the Middle
East registered lower growth rates per annum (both around 4.5 percent). 26 To sum
up, industrial countries are by far the largest export destination for Germany, but
the export growth dynamics are considerably higher in non-industrial countries.
Next, we take a closer look at the data on all newly granted guarantees for the
period 1991 to 2003, which were kindly provided by Euler Hermes. 27 Table 5 dis-
plays the development of Euler Hermes guarantees over time and by region. Clearly,
Asia and Emerging Europe, i.e. Eastern Europe, CIS countries, Malta, Cyprus and
Turkey, receive most export guarantees over the sample period amounting to an av-
erage of 4.4 and 4.0 billion Euros per year, respectively. Note that as for exports, the
Asian crisis took its toll on the total amount of guarantees. 28 Countries in the Mid-
dle East as well as in the Western Hemisphere receive on average around 2.5 billion
per year. In contrast, Africa received least of all non-industrial regions. It should
be noted that the short-term guarantees granted for exports to industrial countries
24See for instance Helpman (1998).
25The United States and Canada are part of the subgroup industrial countries.
26Note the strong growth of exports to the oil exporting countries in the Middle East since 2000,
implying that Germany bene￿tted to some extent from their increasing oil revenues.
27Coverage of risks by guarantees typically distinguishes between before and after the shipment.
The data used in the analysis represents cover after shipment.
28Note that the strong decline in Euler Hermes guarantees in the aftermath of the Asian crisis
supposedly was driven by supply as well as demand side factors.
8have faded away since 1998 in response to a new EU Commission Directive that
limits export credit insurers’ activity to so-called "non-marketable risks". 29 From
then on ECAs had to abstain from short-term business in the EU and the OECD
core countries.30
Note, however, that an interesting picture emerges by looking at the percentage
of total exports covered by Euler Hermes guarantees. Even though the share of total
exports covered has been declining over time with an all time high of 12.3 percent
in the late 1970s (AGA, 2004) to around 3.5 percent in the last decade (see also
Table 6), public export credit guarantees still play a vital role in higher risk regions.
Roughly speaking, every fourth unit of exports was publicly insured over the sample
period to Western Hemisphere (23 percent), the Middle East (20 percent) and Africa
(18 percent), followed by Asia with 16 percent and Eastern Europe with 8 percent.
The relative export coverage to industrial countries is negligible.
A second source of data in the empirical analysis is the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator on political risk provided by the Political Risk Ser-
vices Group (PRS). This quantitative indicator is a blend of political factors that
potentially in￿uence the risk of investing in a country. The analysts’ subjective opin-
ions on the following components (with weights in brackets) constitute the political
risk indicator: Government stability (12), socioeconomic conditions (12), investment
pro￿le (12), internal con￿ict (12), external con￿ict (12), corruption (6), military in
politics (6), religion in politics (6), law and order (6), ethnic tensions (6), democratic
accountability (6), bureaucratic quality (4). 31 The original indicator runs from zero
(very high risk) to one hundred (very low risk). For better intuition, we inverted the
index. Hence, a higher political risk indicator implies higher risk in the importing
country. As a robustness check, we also employ the ICRG’s composite risk index
that consists of the political, ￿nancial and economic risk indicator.
The World Development Indicators constitute a third data source for instance for
data on consumer price indices, gross domestic product, gross ￿xed capital formation
as well as population size. Individual variables and their sources are described in
detail in the appendix. The appendix also contains summary statistics as well as
correlation matrices for the variables used in the regression analysis.
3.2 Empirical model
In the literature, international trade ￿ows have often been studied along the lines of
the gravity equation.32 The basic idea behind a gravity equation is related to physics
and the fact that "gravitational attraction between two bodies depends upon the
29The annual reports on export credit guarantees of the Federal Republic of Germany provide a
constant update on such issues (AGA, 2001), (AGA, 2002) and (AGA, 2003). For more details on
the jurisdiction see the European Union website http://europa.eu.int.
30Exceptions to this rule are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Republic of Korea,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey, whereby the new
EU accession countries are viewed as marketable risk starting from 2005. Note that these countries
do not show up as industrial countries anyway in the above classi￿cation of regions.
31Since this political risk indicator also incorporates issues like corruption and law and order it
is sometimes interpreted as an indicator of institutional quality.
32This methodology dates back to Tinbergen (1962) and P￿yh￿nen (1963), who ￿rst estimated
a gravity equation for trade ￿ows.
9mass of each body and the distance separating them" (Baldwin, 1994, p.119). In
other words and in the context of this paper: Trade ￿ows between Germany and
other countries depend on countries’ economic size and all kinds of transaction costs,
ranging from pure transportation costs and information costs to hidden transaction
costs like political risk.33
As attrition in physics, certain frictions will impede the exchange in goods or
capital. As a consequence, the gravity model has been augmented by various factors
thereby controlling for di￿erent frictions in international trade and capital ￿ows.
The introductory quote by Tinbergen represents such a case in point. Consequently,
we include an indicator for political risk as an important friction in our analysis of
German exports. Note that public export guarantees aim at alleviating this friction.
By combining these two variables in our empirical gravity model, we reconcile recent
work on export behavior from Egger and Url (2006) and Meon and Sekkat (2004).
While the former takes account of public export guarantees, the latter incorporate
an indicator of political risk.
The gravity model, albeit initially an empirical approach, has been deduced from
a variety of economic theories on goods and asset trade, respectively. The ￿rst paper
in this regard is Anderson (1979) who derives the gravity model from an expenditure
point of view, i.e. he assumes that national expenditure on tradeable commodities is
a function of income and population. Bergstrand (1985) provides a microeconomic
foundation of the gravity model using a general equilibrium framework. Concerning
the volume of trade, for instance Helpman (1998) derives an equation in which the
volume of trade depends positively on the trading partners’ GDP levels. Empirical
studies on trade ￿ows using the gravity equation are numerous. Among recent studies
is Rose (2004) who uses the gravity model to estimate the impact of the World Trade
Organization on the volume of trade between a large number of countries.
3.3 The gravity equation
We estimate a speci￿cation of the gravity model along the lines of Egger and Url
(2006). It is important to note, however, that we have added a crucial variable when
determining the e￿ect of guarantees on exports, namely political risk. 34 Our baseline
equation is as follows:
ln(Exportsc,t) = c + α ln(gdpc,t) + β ln(distc) + γ ln(popc,t) + δ ln(guaranteesc,t) +
+ θ ln(riskc,t) + η ln(otherc,t) + µc + µt + εc,t.
where subscript c for the receiving country and t for time (year). The dependent
variable is:
• ln(exportsc,t): Log of real exports from Germany to country c in year t
33Note that Tinbergen (1962, p.263) also pointed out that distance would not only proxy for
transportation but also for information costs. An in￿uential paper in this context is Portes and
Rey (2005) who conclude that information asymmetries signi￿cantly contribute to the explanation
of cross-border equity as well as trade ￿ows.
34All variables are converted in real terms by using the appropriate consumer price indices and
are in denominated in Euro or have been converted to Euro as described in the appendix.
10The set of regressors include35:
• ln(gdpc,t) : Log of real GDP of country c in year t
• ln(distc): Log of distance between Germany and country c
• ln(popc,t): Log of population for country c in year t
• ln(guaranteesc,t): Log of real newly granted guarantees for country c in year t
• ln(riskc,t): Log of political risk index in country c in year t
• ln(otherc,t): Other control variables for country c in year t
Note that the data-set exhibits two dimensions and thus two unobserved e￿ects
may exist: country µc and time µt speci￿c e￿ects. The error term εc,t is assumed to
have a mean of zero as well as a constant variance.
We use several estimation techniques to check the robustness of our results. First,
we use a standard random e￿ects model as a benchmark. In line with Egger and Url
(2006) we also estimate a Mundlak (1978) type random e￿ects model. They argue
that the Mundlak speci￿cation has the advantage to capture short- as well as long-
run e￿ects of the various variables. This is done by including the averages over time
for each time-variant variable (see Mundlak (1978), Egger and Pfa￿ermayr (2004)
and Egger and Url (2006)). The coe￿cient on each variable approximates the short-
run impact and the coe￿cient on the averages over time of each variable accounts
for the additional long-run impact. 36
Finally, we estimate the above equation using a dynamic estimator which we ex-
pect to re￿ect the long run impact more appropriately. There are several reasons
to assume that past exports exert a signi￿cant e￿ect on current exports. With re-
gard to the latter, Bun and Klaassen (2002) have argued that repeated interactions
between business partners as well as sunk costs related to distribution and service
networks warrant a dynamic speci￿cation of the model. Omitting past exports from
the regression equation would hence lead to inconsistent results.
Choice of variables
The determinants of German exports in this paper include the "usual" gravity
factors such as GDP and distance as proxies for market size and information costs.
As additional controls, guarantees, an index covering political risk in the importing
country as well as other control variables proxying for the importer country’s relative
factor endowments, namely the gross ￿xed capital formation in percent of GDP as
well as the share of manufacturing imports of total merchandize imports in debtor
countries, are included in the baseline speci￿cation. We expect the following e￿ects
of the explanatory variables:
GDP: GDP is commonly used in gravity models as a proxy for market size.
Given that we analyze exports from Germany to other countries, we only include
35See Appendix to this chapter for sources and exact de￿nition of variables.
36Note, originally the averages of the variables "between e￿ects" were included to control for
correlations between random e￿ects and explanatory variables.
11the recipient country’s GDP. The rationale behind this variable is that international
demand for German exports is ceteris paribus higher in larger economies. In addition,
German exporters have more opportunities to sell their products in larger markets
and the gain experience the more customers they trade with in a country, i.e there
are economies of scale when dealing with larger countries.
Distance: We expect a negative coe￿cient for distance, which we consider to be
a proxy for transportation as well as information costs. Note that a positive e￿ect
could also be rationalized should the correlation of a country’s business cycle with
Germany’s business cycle decrease with distance.
Guarantees: At the heart of this study lies the question whether o￿cial export
credit guarantees indeed foster exports. For several reasons a positive coe￿cient for
guarantees is expected: First, Abraham and Dewit (2000) show in a theoretical model
of o￿cial export insurance that export guarantees can reduce the pro￿t uncertainty
of risk averse exporters, which stems from default risk on the importer’s side. This
risk reduction increases exports to (risky) markets where exporting companies would
not sell otherwise.37 As shown in the opening remark, assistance in opening up
di￿cult markets is indeed one of Euler Hermes’ goals. Second, it is a well-established
fact in the literature that the decision to enter foreign markets entails substantial
sunk costs. In the presence of such entry costs, Dixit (1989) shows theoretically
that current market participation is a￿ected by prior experience. This insight was
empirically con￿rmed among others by Roberts and Tybout (1997), who ￿nd that
prior export experience increases the probability of exporting by as much as 60
percentage points. Bernard and Wagner (2001) ￿nd a largely comparable e￿ect for
German data. Furthermore, in an uncertain environment exporters may be reluctant
to reverse their decision to export later, even when the initial stimulus in form of a
favorable exchange rate or export promotion is removed. Hence, a transitory shock
can lead to a permanent change in the export structure. This phenomenon is called
"hysteresis". Bernard and Jensen (2004) argue that public export agencies may have
a positive e￿ect on export participation by gathering information on foreign markets
and thereby reducing entry costs. 38 In a similar vein, if public guarantees initiate an
export relationship, learning e￿ects on the side of the exporter as well as the export
credit agency are expected, which make future exports to this country more likely. 39
Finally, maintaining export relations/trade credits during times of ￿nancial distress
allows exporters to pro￿t from the strong export growth during the recovery phase
as for instance in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis in 1997/98.
Political risk: As we have mentioned above, one contribution of this paper is
to estimate the impact of political risk on exports. We expect political risk to exert
a negative impact on trade ￿ows given the fact that higher political risk poses
an important friction for exporters. Hence, we anticipate a negative coe￿cient on
37Abraham and Dewit (2000) demonstrate that this policy objective can be achieved without
subsidization by charging a fair premium.
38In fact, contemporaneous export promotion does not turn out to be signi￿cant in their estima-
tions, but "the selection of large plants may be exactly the wrong sample to observe the e￿ects of
state export promotion, as most agencies explicitly target small and medium ￿rms (Bernard and
Jensen, 2004).
39On the exporters’ side an importer-exporter business relation is established and a better un-
derstanding of the business climate unfolds. On the export insurance side the country risk expertise
is enhanced and credit risk tools are further improved.
12political risk: Countries with higher political risk receive ceteris paribus less exports,
i.e political risk impedes trade ￿ows. Furthermore, controlling for political risk is
desirable when measuring the export promotion e￿ect of guarantees on exports, as
the omitted variable bias is reduced.
Other: As in Egger and Url (2006), we include a country’s gross ￿xed capital for-
mation to GDP ratio as well as a country’s share of manufacturing imports in overall
imports to proxy for a country’s relative factor endowment. We expect positive co-
e￿cients as German trade is dominated by "intra-industry trade", i.e. exports are
ceteris paribus directed to countries with a similar factor endowment. Furthermore,
we include time dummies for each year to control for time speci￿c events.
4 Empirical Results
This section presents the results from our regression analysis. We ￿rst present the
speci￿cation based on the random e￿ects model as well as the Mundlak (1978)
type random e￿ects regressions as a benchmark for our results against Egger and
Url (2006). Furthermore, we estimate a dynamic version of the gravity model, i.e we
explicitly allow past exports to have an impact on current exports, by using a system
GMM estimator introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998). Secondly, we check for
the robustness of the results with regard to adding additional variables as well as
splitting the sample across time and country groups.
4.1 Baseline speci￿cation
The starting point of our empirical analysis is given by the equation in the last
section without controlling for risk. Table 1 shows the results without (columns 1
and 2) as well as with political risk (columns 3 and 4).
Columns (1) and (2) contain the results for the random e￿ects GLS and a Mundlak-
type random e￿ects model. The model ￿ts the data well. We obtain a high R-squared
which is typical for gravity models. The e￿ect of guarantees on exports is positive
and signi￿cant providing support for the hypothesis that guarantees indeed lead to
higher exports. The average overall e￿ect of guarantees on exports is comparable to
the one found in the literature by Egger and Url (2006). 40 The coe￿cients of the
other explanatory are as expected: German companies export more to countries with
larger market size, measured by GDP, while more populous countries receive ceteris
paribus less exports, i.e. countries with lower per capita income obtain fewer exports.
Note that a higher market size re￿ects a combination of demand and supply factors
as larger countries demand more goods and at the same time o￿er more opportu-
nities for exporters such as economies of scale with regard to market entry costs.
The positive coe￿cient on the ratio of capital formation to GDP as well as a larger
share of manufacturing imports in total imports is associated with more imports
supporting the hypothesis that countries with a similar factor endowment receive
40This will be discussed at length below.
13Table 1: Static Speci￿cation for Various Estimators
RE-Standard RE-Mundlak RE-Standard RE-Mundlak
Guarantees 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.019***
(3.9) (3.15) (3.18) (2.83)
GDP 1.032*** 1.115*** 0.965*** 0.981***
(20.99) (9.56) (20.48) (9.39)
Population -0.158*** -0.914*** -0.080* -1.208***
(3.31) (4.43) (1.69) (6.15)
Distance -0.794*** -0.743*** -0.780*** -0.716***
(10.44) (10.22) (11.6) (11.51)
Capital Formation 0.391*** 0.364*** 0.348*** 0.344***
(8.62) (7.65) (8.17) (7.86)
Manufacturing Imports 0.810*** 0.728*** 1.058*** 0.952***
(8.49) (7.1) (11.75) (10.02)
avg. Guarantees 0.202*** 0.183***
(5.12) (5.35)
avg. GDP -0.352** -0.329**
(2.51) (2.53)
avg. Population 0.842*** 1.313***
(3.94) (6.32)
avg. Capital Formation 0.105 0.017
(0.49) (0.09)
avg. Manufact. Imports -0.229 -0.534
(0.63) (1.6)
Political Risk -0.146*** -0.100**
(3.61) (2.46)
avg. Political Risk -0.650***
(2.75)
No. of Obs. 1193 1193 1057 1057
No. of Countries 130 130 112 112
R2 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms. Constant,
region and time speci￿c e￿ects included.* signi￿cant at 10; ** 5 and *** 1 percent
more exports. Finally, the coe￿cient on the distance variable is negative and signif-
icant, which is rationalized by the fact that transportation as well as information
costs are likely to rise for countries situated further away from Germany.
In columns (3) and (4) we proceed to include our proxy for political risk in the
regression. Again we use a random e￿ects GLS and a Mundlak-type random e￿ects
model. The results clearly con￿rm that political risk represents an important friction
in international trade. Countries with less stable governments, a higher probability of
internal or external con￿ict and a higher level of corruption deter German exporters.
In fact, a one percent rise in the political risk index leads to a reduction of about 0.1
percent in the short run and 0.65 percent in the long run. With regard to guarantees
we continue to ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant albeit smaller e￿ect on exports. By
controlling for political risk, we reduce the omitted variable bias, i.e. the problem
that guarantees themselves are associated with political risk. After controlling for
political risk, we still observe in columns (3) and (4) that more guarantees lead
14ceteris paribus to larger export volumes.
The regression analysis presented so far can be challenged in two di￿erent aspects.
First, the underlying data generating process is potentially dynamic (see Bun and
Klaassen (2002)) and thus the estimates for both short- and the long-run e￿ects will
be biased (Egger and Pfa￿ermayr, 2004). Secondly, the empirical speci￿cation may
su￿er from an endogeneity problem which would lead to biased and inconsistent
coe￿cients. The argument is that the causality may also run the other away around
with exporters demanding more guarantees for countries where they export more.
In order to deal with both issues we estimate a dynamic speci￿cation of the gravity
model. However, given that the "within estimator" (￿xed e￿ects regression) yields
biased estimates when a lagged dependent variable is included (Nickell, 1981) we
use an instrumental variable approach. Following Blundell and Bond (1998) we use
the so-called system generalized method of moments estimator which uses lagged
levels as instruments in the di￿erence equation and additionally ￿rst di￿erences
for the level equation. Our use of the system-GMM estimator is also partly driven
by the high persistence in the export series. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that
a high persistence in the series leads to weak instruments in the di￿erence GMM
estimator and can thus be subject to bias. The use of additional instruments under
the system GMM estimator results in much smaller biases and greater precision in
the estimates.
Table 2 presents the results of the dynamic speci￿cation of equation 1. There
are two important take-aways from column (1). First, the results con￿rm that the
data generating process is dynamic. The coe￿cient of the lagged dependent variable
(exports in the previous period) is positive and signi￿cant. Secondly, the validity of
the instruments chosen has to be examined. This is done by the Hansen test which
explicitly tests the validity of the instruments. The test statistics do not suggest
that there is an endogeneity problem present in our empirical model. The Hansen
test is insigni￿cant at the 5 percent level implying that the instruments are valid.
The dynamic speci￿cation shows that the long run e￿ect of guarantees on exports
is given by an elasticity of around 0.06 and thus much smaller than based on the
Mundlak speci￿cation.
The crucial question is whether this statistical e￿ect is economically large. Our
coe￿cient of interest, δ, is positive and signi￿cant in all speci￿cations but exhibits
quite some variation over the di￿erent speci￿cations, ranging from 0.021 (random
e￿ects speci￿cation with political risk) to 0.20 (short-term plus long-term e￿ect
(0.019+0.183) in the Mundlak speci￿cation). As a consequence, the implied multi-
plier e￿ect of public export guarantees varies as well. In order to get an idea of the
magnitude, we use the estimated coe￿cient of the speci￿cation in Table 2 column
(1) (δ=0.03/(1-0.5)=0.06). Since the dependent as well as the independent variable
of interest is denoted in logarithms, the result can be interpreted as an elasticity.
A 1 percent increase in guarantees leads to an 0.06 percent increase in exports. To
better grasp the magnitude, we can compute an average elasticity. Export credit
guarantees granted per year and country average 172 million Euro and the average
amount of German exports is about 4.8 billion Euro. A 1 percent increase of guar-
antees (1.7 million Euro on average) leads consequently to an increase of exports
amounting to nearly 2.9 million Euro. We therefore ￿nd an economically relevant
15Table 2: Dynamic Speci￿cations
All Non-Industrial Non-Industrial Non-Industrial
Countries Countries Countries Countries
before 1999 after 1998
Exportsi,t−1 0.500*** 0.461*** 0.582*** 0.432***
(4.83) (4.63) (5.03) (2.63)
Guarantees 0.030** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.063**
(2.44) (2.88) (2.63) (2.13)
GDP 0.457*** 0.497*** 0.319*** 0.480***
(4.23) (4.71) (2.6) (3.82)
Population 0.024 0.017 0.029 0.009
(0.66) (0.5) (0.97) (0.14)
Distance 0.357*** 0.232** 0.112* 0.289
(3.86) (2.29) (1.81) (1.45)
Capital Formation 0.270*** 0.271*** 0.282*** 0.241***
(2.81) (4.23) (3.71) (3.06)
Manufacturing Imports 0.393* 0.299* 0.282 0.244
(1.83) (1.75) (1.57) (1.22)
Political Risk 0.198** 0.316*** 0.309*** 0.330*
(2.46) (3.65) (2.73) (1.82)
No. of Obs. 985 791 423 368
No. of Countries 112 91 84 84
Hansen p-value 0.09 0.32 0.15 0.38
Hansen df 48 48 20 26
AR(1) p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05
AR(2) p-value 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.59
Windmeijer corrected t-statistics in parentheses. All variables are in logarithms.
Constant, region and time speci￿c e￿ects included.* signi￿cant at 10; ** 5 and
*** at 1 percent.
multiplier in height of 1.7.41
This result is noteworthy for three reasons. Provided that the long-term e￿ect are
correctly captured by the dynamic speci￿cation, this result indicates that export
promotion is indeed successful. Secondly, while the empirical results are pretty much
in line with (Egger and Url, 2006), whose preferred speci￿cation yields a multiplier
in height of 2.8, it is noteworthy that the speci￿cation closest to them 42 yields a
much higher multiplier (Table 1, column (2)) of around 6. This speci￿cation clearly
represents our upper bound for the multiplier e￿ect. The magnitude of the multiplier
compared with the multiplier of the dynamic speci￿cation gives some indication that
the former multiplier is potentially biased upwards.
Next, we present the results for non-industrial countries only - ￿rst for the whole
time period and second for two sub-periods. There are two arguments for this ap-
41The short run e￿ects are typically substantially smaller than one given that most guarantees
are granted for a period of more than one year. Hence, while newly granted guarantees in a given
year show up in the respective year exports occur only after considerable delay.
42The speci￿cation only di￿ers in the explanatory variable on manufacturing imports. While
Egger and Url express this variable in percent of total imports our variable is expressed in percent
of merchandise imports. We would suspect that this di￿erence is negligible.
16proach. First, guarantees are provided as an insurance against political risk which is
potentially more important in non-industrial countries, i.e. it is especially interesting
to con￿rm the impact of guarantees and political risk for this sub-group of countries.
Secondly, the Knaepen-Package which came into e￿ect in 1999 (see section 2.2) set
new standards for the calculation of risk premia. The latter could have induced a
structural break in 1999. Based on a (rather crude) calculation in line with Dewit
(2001), which is shown in Table 3 in the appendix, we ￿nd for instance that Hermes
claims appear to contain a subsidy component until 1998/1999. We therefore run
the regression for the period before and after the new regulation came into e￿ect.
The overall results for non-industrial countries (column 2) are very much in line
with the dynamic baseline speci￿cation comprising the full sample as guarantees and
political risk turn out with the same sign and signi￿cant. Yet there is an important
caveat. The multiplier of guarantees (0.047/(1-0.461)*1498/200) is now equal to
0.65 which implies that guarantees induce a less than proportionate increase in
exports in the long run.43 Hence, the country sample matters for an evaluation of
the e￿ectiveness of export guarantees.
In addition, we run the dynamic regression for two sub-periods, before and after
1999, i.e. before and after the Knaepen-Package came into e￿ect. The results in
columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 in fact suggest that the change in regulation led to
a signi￿cant change of the impact of guarantees on exports: While guarantees have
a signi￿cant e￿ect in both periods, the multiplier di￿ers substantially. 44 During
the ￿rst period, the multiplier is given by (0.047/(1-0.58)*1258/216)=0.65, while
the respective multiplier in the period is given by (0.064/(1-0.43)*1774/181)=1.09.
Consequently, the new regulation appears to have had a positive e￿ect by reducing
the subsidy component (see Table 3) as well as to increase the export generating
e￿ect of guarantees. For the period from 1999 onwards, we ￿nd that guarantees have
led to a more than proportionate e￿ect on exports, i.e. one unit of guarantees ceteris
paribus led to 1.09 units of exports on average.
4.2 Robustness of the results
In this section, we check the robustness of our results in a number of ways as shown
in Table 11. First, we introduce the real exchange rate as a further control variable. 45
As expected the real exchange rate turns out to have a positive and signi￿cant impact
on exports. A depreciation of the German real exchange rate results results in higher
German exports to the respective country. This result holds for the random e￿ect, the
Mundlak type as well as the dynamic speci￿cation. With regard to guarantees and
political risk our results remain largely unchanged. In fact, the long run multiplier of
guarantees is equal to 2 for the overall sample and 1.08 for non-industrial countries
after 1998.46
43Note that the average amount of guarantees and exports on which this calculation is based
varies with the sample, i.e. guarantees/exports are on average higher/lower for non-industrial
countries than for the full sample.
44One may also hypothesize that export guarantees for capital goods lead to a higher multiplier
than consumption goods. Future research may deal with this issue.
45In a related research question Dell’Ariccia (1999) investigates in a gravity framework the impact
of exchange rate volatility on international trade.
46Results for non-industrial countries are not shown but can be obtained upon request.
17Secondly, we run a regression including an interaction term for guarantees and
political risk. The idea behind this is that the e￿ect of guarantees on exports is
determined by the respective political risk. We ￿rst included both variables and
the interaction term in the regression. However, given the large correlation between
guarantees and the interaction term, both variables turned out to be insigni￿cant.
Hence, we decided to show only the results for the interaction term when guarantees
are excluded. The result con￿rms that the interaction term is signi￿cantly positive.
However, given that we cannot test directly against guarantees we refrain from
further interpretation.
Finally, we use the composite risk indicator provided by PRS Group. This indi-
cator comprises political, ￿nancial and economic risk with the weights given by 50,
25 and 25 percent, respectively. The coe￿cient for the composite risk indicator has
the expected negative sign (higher risk leads to less exports) and is signi￿cant. All
other coe￿cients remain largely unchanged.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present empirical evidence for the e￿ect of o￿cial export credit
guarantees on the volume of exports. Our results are threefold: First, Euler Her-
mes is indeed able to foster exports. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd an economically signi￿cant
multiplier of about 1.7 in the dynamic speci￿cation of the gravity model, which is
considerably smaller than the multiplier based on static panel estimators. In addi-
tion, our results con￿rm that the estimates with regard to the e￿ectiveness of export
credit agencies crucially hinge on the sample of countries and the time period consid-
ered. In fact, based on a sample of non-industrial countries alone, we cannot con￿rm
that export guarantees have been e￿ective over the entire period under consider-
ation. However, after a change in regulation introduced by the Knaepen-Package,
we ￿nd that guarantees led to a more than proportionate increase in exports of a
magnitude of around 1.09 even for the sub-group of non-industrial countries.
Second, we ￿nd strong evidence that political risk has a detrimental e￿ect on ex-
ports. In the wording of the gravity literature, political risk constitutes an important
friction to international trade activity. This ￿nding con￿rms an impression voiced
already by Jan Tinbergen, which has been largely neglected in the empirical trade
literature so far.
Third, we show that a dynamic panel approach is warranted to model interna-
tional trade in a gravity framework as past exports exert a signi￿cant impact on
current exports, supporting the hypothesis that repeated interactions between busi-
ness partners as well as sunk costs related to distribution and service networks should
be considered when thinking about the determinants of international trade ￿ows.
Even though we are able to ￿nd evidence for a trade promoting e￿ect of Euler
Hermes on German exports, still, a note of caution is warranted. It is important to
bear in mind that we only tackled one of the issues central to an overall assessment,
encompassing bene￿ts and costs of an export credit agency. With respect to the
latter, questions about the costs of public export intervention (e.g. the considerable
losses accumulated by Hermes in the 1980s and early 1990s, which consequently
18had to be covered by the state budget) and possible market distortion stemming
from the state interference are beyond the scope of this paper. Even though the
potential hidden subsidy component of risk premia has been de￿nitely reduced to a
substantial extent, one has still to bear in mind that the business models of public
export credit agencies and private sector insurers di￿er. O￿cial ECAs are usually
covered or re-insured by the government and consequently do not have to hold capital
provision for contingent loan losses. Furthermore, their ￿nancial goal is often simply
to break-even. Mandating ECAs to break-even hence carries economic costs. Instead
of investing in an ECA, the government could alternatively invest in ￿nancial assets
with a comparable risk of loss but higher yield returns. Hence, with regard to the
bene￿ts and costs of an export credit agency, one should take the opportunity costs
of maintaining such an institution into account as well. This idea has been recently
voiced by UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI, 2005). There are also a
number of e￿ects which need to be considered in an evaluation of ECAs. Among
these are the possible impact on output, employment and the public budget due to
increased export activity. Further research on public export credit agencies is clearly
desirable.
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226 Appendix
Countries in the sample
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Island,
Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States.
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Congo Republic,Cote d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar,
Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pak-
istan, Panama, Papa-New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi-
Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri-Lanka, South Africa, Syria, Tanzania,
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, South Korea, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
De￿nitions and Sources of variables
• Log Exportsc,t: Logarithm of real exports from Germany to country c in year t (in Euro).
As de￿ator, the CPI (base year 2000) for Germany from the World Bank is used.
Source: Federal Statistical O￿ce Germany and World Development Indicators 2005.
• Log Guaranteesc,t: Logarithm of real newly granted guarantees by Euler Hermes Kred-
itversicherung AG for country c in year t (in Euro). As de￿ator, the CPI (base year 2000)
for Germany from the World Bank is used.
Source: Euler Hermes Kreditversicherung AG and World Development Indicators 2005.
• Log GDPc,t: Logarithm of annual GDP of country c in year t (in constant 2000 USD). The
￿gures are converted to Euro at the current average annual exchange rate (line rf), taken
from the IFS.
Source: World Development Indicators 2005 and IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
• Log Distancec: Logarithm of greater circle distance between Germany and country C. The
exact de￿nition is: d(δG,φG,δC,φC) = r∗cos−1(sinδG∗sinδC+cosδG∗cosδC∗cos(φG−φC))
where δG,δC are latitude and φG,φC longitude of Germany and country c, respectively. r is
the radius of the earth (6317 kilometer).
See http://www.mathworld.wolfram.com/GreatCircle.html.
Source: Rose (2004).
• Log Populationc,t: Logarithm of population size of country c in year t.
Source: World Development Indicators 2005.
• Log Political riskc,t: Logarithm of political indicator for country c in year t. The index
runs from 0 (very high risk) to 100 (very low risk).
Source: Political Risk Services.
• Log Capital Formationc,t: Logarithm of gross ￿xed capital formation in percent of GDP
for country c in year t.
Source: World Development Indicators 2005.
• Log Manufacturing Importsc,t: Logarithm of manufacturing imports in percent of total
merchandise imports for country c in year t.
Source: World Development Indicators 2005.
• Log Real Exchange Ratec,t: Logarithm of foreign consumer price index multiplied by
nominal exchange rate divided through German consumer price index. The real exchange
rate is indexed to the base year 2000.
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
23Figure 1: Claims due to and Recoveries from Political Risk (in million Euro)
Source: AGA (2004)
Table 3: Premia, recoveries and claims on o￿cial export credit insurance for Berne
Union members and Euler Hermes (in billion USD)
Premia Recoveries Claims Berne Union* Hermes**
(1) (2) (3) [(1)+(2)]/(3)
1985-1989 9.26 17.97 47.13 0.58 0.43
1990-1994 15.38 23.61 65.71 0.59 0.33
1995 3.73 8.31 11.81 1.02 0.62
1996 3.66 9.11 10.56 1.21 0.72
1997 3.71 8.3 5.25 2.29 0.83
1998 3.65 7.35 4.77 2.31 1.02
1999 3.68 6.14 6.14 1.60 1.23
2000 3.98 6.11 5.33 1.89 1.10
2001 3.83 7.77 4.44 2.61 1.51
2002 4.11 7.02 5.25 2.12 1.67
2003 4.58 8.68 4.04 3.28 2.43
Source: Dewit (2001) update by Berne Union (2005) for Berne Union
members and AGA (2004) for Euler Hermes, authors’ calculation.
* Premia plus recoveries as a fraction of claims.
** Premia, recoveries and claims for Euler Hermes are not displayed,
but both ratios are computed equally in accordance to Dewit (2001).
24Table 4: Exports by region (in billion Euro)
Year IC Asia Africa ME WH EE
1991 235.5 14.1 6.2 10.3 6.2 11.1
1992 239.5 15.6 6.1 11.5 6.8 16.9
1993 224.8 20.1 5.5 10.3 7.6 29.4
1994 249.8 24.0 5.9 10.5 8.5 32.0
1995 276.8 27.9 6.7 9.8 9.5 38.0
1996 282.8 29.0 6.2 10.0 9.7 43.6
1997 306.3 29.6 6.7 11.5 12.1 54.0
1998 334.6 23.5 7.3 11.6 14.0 59.5
1999 389.2 24.4 7.5 12.4 14.0 55.9
2000 450.7 31.7 8.4 13.9 15.0 69.4
2001 474.7 36.4 10.0 15.9 16.1 77.1
2002 477.4 39.9 9.8 16.7 15.0 84.0
2003 483.8 43.2 10.2 17.0 13.0 90.1
Average 340.5 27.6 7.4 12.4 11.3 50.9
Source: Federal Statistical O￿ce Germany, authors.
Note: IC-Industrial Countries, ME-Middle East, WH-
Western Hemisphere and EE-Eastern Europe.
Table 5: Euler Hermes newly granted guarantees by region (in billion Euro)
Year IC Asia Africa ME WH EE
1991 1.3 2.9 1.8 3.7 2.0 1.3
1992 1.0 2.9 1.7 4.7 1.8 3.4
1993 1.3 4.1 1.2 2.6 2.1 5.5
1994 1.1 5.1 1.7 2.7 2.5 3.8
1995 1.3 6.4 1.3 2.3 2.4 2.6
1996 2.6 6.2 1.5 1.6 2.3 3.5
1997 1.0 6.2 1.2 1.8 2.9 5.1
1998 0.5 3.9 1.0 1.8 3.2 4.7
1999 0.3 4.1 1.0 1.3 2.5 3.8
2000 0.6 4.1 2.6 2.1 3.4 4.8
2001 0.4 5.0 0.9 2.5 3.1 3.8
2002 1.0 3.5 0.9 3.0 2.9 4.7
2003 1.2 3.4 1.0 2.6 2.9 4.6
Average 1.0 4.4 1.4 2.5 2.6 4.0
Source: Euler-Hermes, authors.
Note: IC-Industrial Countries, ME-Middle East, WH-
Western Hemisphere and EE-Eastern Europe.
25Table 6: Overview of Guarantee Business
Year Exports* Newly Granted Guarantees as Cover Total Granted
Guarantees* % of Exports* Applications Ceiling Guarantees
1991 283.6 13.2 4.7 - - -
1992 296.4 16.0 5.4 50.4 92 82.3
1993 297.8 17.3 5.8 43.2 92 85.2
1994 331.0 17.4 5.3 31.6 97.1 92.1
1995 368.9 17.0 4.6 29.8 99.7 91.9
1996 381.5 18.0 4.7 26.7 99.7 97.1
1997 420.5 18.8 4.5 30.2 102.3 99.1
1998 450.5 15.4 3.4 23 109.9 100.9
1999 503.5 13.4 2.7 22.5 112.5 101.1
2000 589.3 19.5 3.3 21 112.5 106.1
2001 630.3 16.5 2.6 21.4 117.6 102.7
2002 642.9 16.4 2.6 22.8 117.6 103
2003 657.4 16.0 2.4 22.7 117 102.9
Average 450.3 16.5 4.0 28.8 105.8 97.0
Source: Euler Hermes, Federal Statistical O￿ce Germany
* Authors’ calculations based on the data set
Note: All variables in billions of Euro
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Non-Industrial Countries Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
Exp. Euro (bill.) 0.75 1.88 0.00 18.26 1892
Guaran. Euro (bill.) 0.11 0.27 0.00 2.95 1749
GDP Euro (bill.) 41.04 111.64 0.03 1333.72 1756
Pop. million 34.62 133.52 0.04 1288.40 1806
Pol. Risk Indicator (0-100) 38.21 12.44 11.00 89.75 1305
Dist. Distance between capital cities 3705.19 1834.64 298.64 8495.06 1881
Cap. Form. % of GDP 22.87 9.38 -0.69 113.58 1698
Man. Imp. % of total merchandise imports 67.85 10.88 24.40 88.84 1209
Real Ex. Rate Index 2000=100 0.91 0.32 0.03 5.16 1567
Comp. Risk Indicator (0-100) 36.29 11.66 8.75 85.50 1158
Industrial Countries Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
Exp. Euro (bill.) 16.39 17.14 0.12 69.60 270
Guaran. Euro (bill.) 0.05 0.12 0.00 1.83 268
GDP Euro (bill.) 867.88 1790.90 4.84 10993.14 299
Pop. million 36.35 59.20 0.26 290.81 299
Pol. Risk Indicator (0-100) 16.13 6.04 3.88 35.75 299
Dist. Distance between capital cities 2075.27 2996.92 151.59 11427.05 286
Cap. Form. % of GDP 21.23 3.08 15.11 32.52 290
Man. Imp. % of total merchandise imports 76.00 6.91 44.95 87.38 291
Real Ex. Rate Index 2000=100 0.97 0.09 0.64 1.33 299
Comp. Risk Indicator (0-100) 16.88 4.59 6.50 37.50 276
All Countries Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
Exp. Euro (bill.) 2.71 8.15 0.00 69.60 2162
Guaran. Euro (bill.) 0.10 0.26 0.00 2.95 2017
GDP Euro (bill.) 161.35 749.01 0.03 10993.14 2055
Pop. million 34.86 125.66 0.04 1288.40 2105
Pol. Risk Indicator (0-100) 34.10 14.38 3.88 89.75 1604
Dist. Distance between capital cities 3490.08 2099.46 151.59 11427.05 2167
Cap. Form. % of GDP 22.63 8.77 -0.69 113.58 1988
Man. Imp. % of total merchandise imports 69.43 10.72 24.40 88.84 1500
Real Ex. Rate Index 2000=100 0.92 0.30 0.03 5.16 1866





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 11: Robustness Check I
RE RE S-GMM S-GMM S-GMM
Standard Mundlak RER Interaction Composite Risk
Exportsi,t−1 0.444*** 0.489*** 0.524***
(4.7) (4.69) (4.89)
Real Exchange Rate 0.209*** 0.189*** 0.263***
(5.7) (5.24) (3.97)
Guarantees 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.030*
(3.06) (2.67) (2.97) (1.94)
GDP 0.953*** 0.951*** 0.519*** 0.462*** 0.449***
(20.16) (8.1) (4.91) (4.2) (3.74)
Population -0.061 -1.149*** -0.032 -0.02 -0.032
(1.26) (5.69) (0.76) (0.54) (0.88)
Distance -0.769*** -0.689*** -0.384*** -0.369*** -0.322***
(11.95) (11.23) (4.46) (4.02) (3.52)
Capital Formation 0.335*** 0.336*** 0.294*** 0.273*** 0.269***
(7.76) (7.6) (3.16) (2.88) (2.81)
Manufacturing Imports 0.927*** 0.814*** 0.492** 0.410* 0.377*
(9.91) (8.32) (2.18) (1.92) (1.89)
Political Risk -0.174*** -0.124*** -0.247*** -0.301***
(4.26) (2.99) (2.94) (2.69)








avg. Capital Formation -0.021
(0.1)
avg. Manufacturing Imports -0.472
(1.34)






No. of Obs. 1009 1009 940 985 917
No. of countries 105 105 105 112 112
R2 0.95 0.96
Hansen p-value 0.32 0.12 0.049
Hansen df 48 48 43
AR(1) p-value 0.001 0.002 0.002
AR(2) p-value 0.055 0.06 0.062
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. Robust t-statistic for random e￿ects
and Windmeyer corrected for System GMM. *,**, *** signi￿cant at 10, 5 and 1 percent.
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